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THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REFORM. Edited by Philip L . .Dubois. 
Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath & Co. 1982. Pp. xi, 187. $24.95. 
Court reform involves much more than the modernization of outdated 
practices of judicial administration. By changing the organization and pro-
cedures of courts, court reform redistributes power within the court system 
and the larger community. The eleven essays in The Politics of Judicial Re-
form explore some of the ways that reform proposals create political con-
flicts among competing groups and interests and in tum shape the outcome 
of reform proposals. 
Although earlier commentators have recognized the political signifi-
cance of judicial reform, the literature on the subject is sparse.I The Politics 
of Judicial Reform does not attempt to present a comprehensive survey, for 
as editor Philip L. Dubois notes, no single book could hope to treat compre-
hensively a topic as broad as the politics of judicial reform (p. 11). By high-
lighting some of the political rainifi.cations of reform, however, Dubois 
illustrates the breadth of the subject and demonstrates the importance of its 
continued study. 
The essays begin with an introduction to some of the basic political 
dimensions of court reform. Henry R. Glick emphasizes the role political 
parties play in court reform. Since state-level reforms generally "shift judi-
cial administration from local control and independence to centralized 
court management" (p. 17), groups with vested interest in locally managed 
courts often oppose the reforms. According to Glick, these groups include 
local judges and court employees; the Democratic Party, which has a strong 
influence on judicial elections in its urban strongholds; and general-practice 
and trial lawyers, who are accustomed to existing structures and who are 
usually Democrats (pp. 23-25). The proponents of reform often include bar 
associations,2 the federal government, middle class civic organizations, the 
Republican Party,3 and "high-status" lawyers, who are often bar activists 
and Republican partisans (pp. 20-23). Although proponents have achieved 
recent successes in streamlining and consolidating the courts, Glick ob-
serves that state court systems remain highly decentralized.4 
Glick probably overstates the partisan aspect of court reform. First, Re-
publican advocacy of court reform may be limited to cities, where the party 
lacks power. As Glick notes, legislative opponents of court reform "come 
1. Geoff Gallas has observed the political aspect of court reform and suggested that it 
needs to be explored. See Gallas, Court Reform: Has it been Built on an Adequate Founda-
tion?, 63 JUDICATURE 28, 37 (1979). For other works on the political aspects of judicial re-
form, see notes 13 & 14 infra. 
2. Glick suggests that bar associations became involved in court reform to improve the 
image and economic status of lawyers and the image of justice in general. One of their prime 
concerns has been the elimination of partisan influence in the selection of judges in favor of 
merit-based selection. P. 20. 
3. Glick notes that Republican officials frequently oppose the link between judges and 
local party politics in order to lessen Democratic influence in urban politics. P. 24-25. 
4. For example, Glick notes that state courts remain largely dependent upon local govern-
ment for funding. P. 27. 
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more often from rural areas where traditional values and local control are 
more important" (p. 25). In states with large urban populations, the rural 
or outstate legislators have come predominantly from the Republican 
Party.5 Second, Glick presents no solid evidence linking general-practice 
and trial lawyers with the Democratic Party. He notes only that these law-
yers occupy lower rungs on the socioeconomic ladder than do "high-status" 
lawyers (p. 24). If socioeconomic status is taken as a measure of partisan-
ship, general-practice and trial lawyers may be less likely to be Republicans 
than their "high-status" counterparts. Given the relatively high socioeco-
nomic status of lawyers as a group, however, lower status lawyers do not 
necessarily share a strong Democratic predisposition. 
The essays in Part II examine court reform in a broader political con-
text. Frank Munger argues that popular political upheavals have influ-
enced the major court reform movements of this century (pp. 51-67). Court 
reform, according to Munger, has been led historically by legal elites which 
"carry out a self-appointed mandate to improve the court system" (p. 53). 
Although these elites have sought to protect their own interests, they also 
have attempted to restore legitimacy to threatened governmental institu-
tions by strengthening the credibility of the legal system (pp. 61-62).6 Dur-
ing the Progressive Era, court reformers strove to assist those classes with 
little political influence by attacking cumbersome procedures and poor ad-
ministration of local courts (pp. 55-56). During the New Deal, realist legal 
theory helped reformers rationalize the transfer of policy enforcement from 
the courts to administrative tribunals as ensuring greater popular control 
over government decisionmaking (pp. 57-59). Since the 1960's, court re-
formers have attempted to divert relatively unimportant cases from the 
courts to accommodate the increasing number of cases involving important 
political issues that other branches have not handled (pp. 59-61). Thus, 
although court reform is commonly justified in terms of efficiency, the ide-
als of court reform have changed when differing demands have been placed 
on the government and the courts (p. 62).7 
Against this backdrop, Richard Gambitta and Marlynn May suggest 
that reforms designed to increase access to the courts and reduce court con-
gestion have combined to create popular dissatisfaction with the courts (pp. 
69-83). Under these reforms, more people have contact with the judicial 
system, but their disputes are often settled through informal negotiation 
and reconciliation rather than formal adjudication. Gambitta and May ar-
5. See T. DYE, POLITICS IN STATES AND COMMUNITIES 104 (2d ed. 1973); V. KEY, AMERI-
CAN STATE POLITICS 230-34 (1956). 
6. Munger's analysis modifies the views of Lawrence Friedman, who sees judicial reform 
solely as a self-serving activity undertaken by elites in the legal profession to maintain their 
control within the profession and create a favorable public image. See Friedman, Law Reform 
in Historical Perspective, 13 ST. Lours U. L.J. 351, 357-58 (1969). Munger argues that Fried-
man "does not devote sufficient attention to the continuous pressures on lawyers to maintain 
compatibility between the legal system and other institutions in the society." P. 54. 
7. During the Progressive era, efficiency, Munger suggests, meant greater access to govern-
mental institutions. In the New Deal-Realist period, it meant doing away with normative 
distinctions between judiciary and administration and accepting the bare fact of authority or 
power. Recently, it has had a strong overtone of excluding unimportant, minor, and new 
rights. P. 62. 
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gue that courts derive legitimacy from popular acceptance of "the myth of 
the triad" (p. 73). The elements of the triadic model are (1) a neutral judge 
who resolves disputes by (2) applying preexisting rules to cases presented in 
adversarial proceedings and (3) publicly explaining the reasons for the deci-
sion.8 Reforms, Gambitta and May conclude, are eroding the triad's ac-
ceptance and contributing to reported increases9 in popular dissatisfaction 
(p. 79). 
Gambitta and May, however, lack the necessary empirical evidence to 
support their position.10 Without such evidence, one could assert with 
equal plausibility that informal methods of resolving disputes actually limit 
popular disillusionment with the courts. Formal proceedings are often 
costly and time-consuming. In spite of reforms aimed at reducing conges-
tion, they also may be marked by long delays. Informal methods allow 
parties to avoid these obstacles. Moreover, parties may be more satisfied 
with a result to which they have agreed than with a court-imposed result. 
Further empirical study seems necessary to determine the popular impact 
of informal dispute resolution. 
Following a collection of legislative and administrative case studies in 
Parts III and IV, Larry Cohen attacks current "depoliticized" methods of 
evaluating the competency of judges. These methods, Cohen argues, pre-
clude public input, because they attempt to measure qualities, such as "legal 
ability'' and ''.judicial temperament," that are "either unobserved by those 
outside the legal process or simply inaccessible to the objective assessment" 
(p. 170). Cohen asserts that "repoliticizing" the competence issue would 
give the public a genuine role in evaluating the courts. Somewhat vaguely, 
Cohen advocates repoliticization through surveying "lawyers, other court 
actors, clients, interest-group representatives, and the various sectors of the 
general public" (p. 173). Cohen concedes that a repoliticizing process will 
be difficult to develop and operationalize, but he contends that methods can 
be developed from current social science models (pp. 172-73). 
Although consonant with current trends in the critical legal studies 
movement, Cohen's proposal cuts against the grain of modem court reform. 
To promote professionalism in the judiciary, reformers have sought the de-
politicization ( or "professionalization") that Cohen assails, largely through 
efforts to abolish judicial elections.11 Curiously, Cohen does not advocate 
elections as a possible means of repoliticization, 12 and he fails to explain 
8. The triadic model as an ideal legitimating the courts has been proposed by many schol-
ars. See, e.g., T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (2d ed. 1962); Arnold, Law En-
forcement - An Attempt at Social .Dissection, 42 YALE L.J. I (1932); Cavanagh & Sarat, 
Thinking About Courts: Toward and Beyond a Jurisprudence of Judicial Competence, 14 LAW & 
SocY. REv. 371 (1980); Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 
(1978); Sarat, Support far the Legal System: An Analysis of Knowledge, Attitudes and Behavior, 
3 AM. POL. Q. 1 (1975). 
9. See YANKELOVICH, SKELLY & WHITE, INC., THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF COURTS (1978). 
10. Gambitta and May admit that an empirical study is necessary to validate their argu-
ment. P. 80. 
11. Glick notes these efforts in his essay. Pp. 19-20. 
12. Cohen's admitted aim is to "invigorate the political element in competence discussions 
while retaining the admitted expertise of those particularly well suited to observe judicial be-
havior ..•• " Pp. 171-72. 
March 1983] Politics of Judicial Reform 777 
why elections do not give the public sufficient input in those jurisdictions 
that retain them. Yet even though he avoids this sensitive issue, leaders of 
the bar are likely to view his proposal skeptically, as too great an intrusion 
on judicial professionalism. 
The Politics of Judicial Reform sketches a broad outline of its subject, 
focusing on some of its aspects and leaving others unexplored. The essays, 
while provocative, are at times speculative and lacking in depth. Dubois 
suggests that interested readers should supplement this book with the few 
other collections13 and case studies14 in the area (p. 11). Still, The Politics of 
Judicial Reform offers a unique introduction to "aspects of judicial reform 
[that] have been too long neglected by court-reform leaders and students of 
the courts" (p. 2). 
13. E.g., L. BERKSON, W. HAYS & S. CARBON, MANAGING THE STATE COURTS {1977); R. 
WHEELER & H. WHITCOMB, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (1977). While somewhat more de-
tailed than Dubois's collection, these works do not share its strong emphasis on the political 
factors underlying judicial reform. 
Dubois has edited another collection designed to complement this one. See P. DuBOIS, 
THE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL REFORM (1982). 
14. E.g., L. BERKSON & S. CARBON, COURT UNIFICATION: HISTORY, POLITICS AND IM-
PLEMENTATION (1978); P. FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
(1973). Berkson and Hays focus upon state court reform, presenting some detail on campaigns 
to achieve court reform. Fish's work, as the title suggests, deals solely with federal reforms, 
offering an historical survey beginning in the early days of the republic. 
